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NOTES 
Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public Sector: Disclosing 
Employee Names and Addresses Under Exemption 6 of the 
Freedom of Information Act 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Federal Labor-Management Rela-
tions Statute (Fed. L-M Statute), 1 which regulates labor relations in 
the federal public sector.2 The Fed. L-M Statute requires that federal 
agencies· disclose to a certified union, "to the extent not prohibited by 
law," data "reasonably available and necessary" for collective bargain-
ing. 3 Although employee name and address lists are generally consid-
ered available and necessary,4 debate continues over whether release of 
this information is "prohibited by law," specifically by the Privacy 
Act.5 
In general, the Privacy Act prohibits government agencies from 
disseminating personal information without the written permission of 
the person to whom the information pertains. 6 Two enumerated ex-
ceptions to the Act, however, may permit disclosure of employee 
1. 5 u.s.c. §§ 7101-7135 (1988). 
2. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (1988) states, in part, "It is the purpose of this chapter to prescribe 
certain rights and obligations of the employees of the Federal Government and to establish pro-
cedures which are designed to meet the special requirements and needs of the Government." 
Public and private sector labor relations are two separate and distinct areas and are regulated 
under different statutory schemes. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-168 (1988), controls labor relations in the private sector. 
3. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) (1988). The Fed. L-M Statute defines collective bargaining as 
the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an agency and the exclu· 
sive representative of employees in an appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable 
times and to consult and bargain in a good faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the 
conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either 
party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining agreement reached •••• 
5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(l2) (1988). 
4. Every circuit court to review the matter has held that employee names and addresses are 
"necessary" for collective bargaining. See FLRA v. United States Dept. of the Treasury, 884 
F.2d 1446, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990); United States Dept. of 
Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1138 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988); United States 
Dept. of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 231-32 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 
(1988); United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and 
remanded, 488 U.S. 1025, vacated as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989); United States Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129, 1133 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 
880 (1988); American Fedn. of Govt. Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554, 557 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
5. 5 u.s.c. § 552a (1988). 
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988) states, "No agency shall disclose any record which is contained 
in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, 
except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to 
whom the record pertains .... " 
980 
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names and addresses to unions. Section 552a(b)(3) allows disclosure 
for a "routine use"7 and section 552a(b)(2)8 authorizes an agency to 
release information otherwise obtainable under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA).9 This Note will not address the "routine use" 
exception because courts generally have avoided consideration of this 
issue by granting disclosure under FOIA.10 
FOIA is a general disclosure statute, requiring that federal agen-
cies release all requested information contained in agency files. 11 Nine 
narrow exemptions to the Act, however, allow the government to 
withhold records under certain circumstances.12 Exemption 6, which 
is most relevant here, limits disclosure of "personnel and medical files 
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy."13 If Exemption 6 does not 
apply and FOIA renders employee names and addresses obtainable, 
the Privacy Act does not prevent their disclosure. Because release 
would therefore not be "prohibited by law," the Fed. L-M Statute 
would require that federal agencies disclose employee names and ad-
dresses to unions. 
Until recently, with the exception of the Fourth Circuit, 14 every 
circuit court to consider the question of whether FOIA exempts em-
ployee names and addresses from the Privacy Act's restrictions an-
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1988). The "routine use" exception allows disclosure of records for 
uses that are "compatible with the purpose for which [the information] was collected." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(a)(7) (1988). An agency maintaining a system of records must describe in a Federal 
Register notice "each routine use of the records •.. including the categories of users and the 
purpose of such use." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (1988). 
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1988). 
9. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988). 
10. See United States Dept. of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1137 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988); United States Dept. of Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 232 (7th 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 
1139, 1142 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded, 488 U.S. 1025 (1989), vacated as moot, 
876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989); United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 
1129, 1134 n.6 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); American Fedn. of Govt. 
Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554, 556 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986). But see FLRA v. United 
States Dept. of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1453-56 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
863 (1990) (holding that names and addresses are not subject to disclosure under the Privacy 
Act's routine use exception). 
11. For more information on the history and purposes of FOIA, see infra section IV.A. 
12. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (1988). 
13. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1988). 
14. In American Fedn. of Govt. Employees, Local 1923 v. United States Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit did not require disclosure. In 
Local 1923, the Union requested the information directly under FOIA and not by way of the 
Fed. L-M Statute. Four years later, however, in United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. 
FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987), the Fourth Circuit distinguished Local 1923 and required 
disclosure when the Union initiated its request under the Fed. L-M Statute. For a more com-
plete discussion of Local 1923 and the later Fourth Circuit decision, see infra notes 36-42, 52-55 
and accompanying text. 
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swered in the affirmative. ts In permitting disclosure, the courts 
reasoned that any individual interest in privacy was either minimal or 
outweighed by the public interest in collective bargaining. In Septem-
ber 1989, however, the D.C. Circuit held otherwise in Federal Labor 
Relations Authority v. United States Department of the Treasury. t 6 Re-
lying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, t1 the D.C. 
Circuit did not require disclosure, finding that the public interest in 
collective bargaining was not within FOIA's central purpose of open-
ing government activity to public scrutiny.ts 
This Note examines the application of FOIA and the Privacy Act 
to union requests for employee names and addresses under the Fed. L-
M Statute. Part I briefly explores the importance of employee names 
and addresses to collective bargaining. This Part also examines the 
increasingly significant role of public sector unions due to the growth 
in federal public sector employment and the decline of private sector 
unionization. Part II analyzes the various circuit court decisions sup-
porting disclosure in the federal public sector. Part III examines Re-
porters Committee and Department of the Treasury and discusses the 
potential policy implications resulting from the D.C. Circuit's applica-
tion of Reporters Committee in the collective bargaining context. Fi-
nally, Part IV proposes an alternative reading of FOIA that removes 
the barrier of Reporters Committee and better serves the goals of both 
the Privacy Act and the Fed. L-M Statute. 
I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
Through enactment of the Fed. L-M Statute, Congress gave fed-
eral employees the statutory right to bargain collectively. t9 In so do-
15. United States Dept. of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 
881 (1988); United States Dept. of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229 (7th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 
1988), vacated and remanded, 488 U.S. 1025, vacated as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989); 
United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. 
dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); American Fedn. of Govt. Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 
F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1986); Local 1923, 712 F.2d 931; see infra Part II for a detailed discussion of 
these cases. 
16. 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990). 
17. 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1481 (1989) (noting that whether disclosure constitutes an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy under Exemption 7(C) turns on the nature of the requested document and its 
relationship to the basic purpose of FOIA to "open agency action to the light of public scru-
tiny"); see infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Reporters 
Committee. 
18. 884 F.2d at 1456. 
19. Prior to the enactment of the Fed. L-M Statute, Executive Order 10,988 and 11,491 
governed federal sector union activity. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963), re-
pealed by Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970). Executive Order 11,491 was 
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 605 (1971-1975); Exec. Order No. 11,636, 3 
C.F.R. 634 (1971-1975); and Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1971-1975). Under the 
Orders, the "collective bargaining process was saddled with limitations and viewed with skepti-
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ing, Congress recognized the importance of employee collective 
bargaining, stating: 
the right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and participate 
through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which 
affect them[:] (A) safeguards the public interest[;] (B) contributes to the 
effective conduct of public business[;] and (C) facilitates and encourages 
the amicable settlement[] of disputes between employees and their em-
ployers involving conditions of employment .... 20 
Congressional support of union activity by federal employees has 
assumed increasing significance due to the growth in public sector em-
ployment. From 1970 to 1988, the number of paid federal civilian 
employees increased from 2,645,000 to 2,981,000.21 During roughly 
the same period, public sector union membership remained relatively 
stable at approximately 40%. 22 Because of the decline in private sec-
tor unionization, however, public sector unions actually increased 
their proportion of total union membership from 23.2% to 35.8% be-
tween 1973 and 1987.23 Thus, as the public sector labor force grows, 
collective bargaining efforts have the potential to reach more people 
and may thus become a more important mechanism for safeguarding 
employee rights.24 In addition, with the predicted continued demise of 
private sector unionization, 25 the public sector may become the last 
stronghold for organized labor in the United States. 26 Indeed, as com-
mentators have noted, labor relations in the public sector is "where the 
action is. "27 
Placed in this context, the significance of releasing employee names 
cism by employees." McMillion, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Sector: Has the Congres-
sional Intent Been Fulfilled?, 127 MIL. L. REv. 169, 188 (1990). Dissatisfied with the existing 
labor-management program, Congress sought through the Fed. L-M Statute to expand the rights 
of federal employees beyond those contemplated by the Orders and to give labor organizations 
more latitude in the labor-management arena. Id. at 197. For further discussion of Executive 
Orders 10,988 and 11,491, see id. at 176-99. 
20. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1988). 
21. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1990, at 324 (Table No. 522) (llOth ed. 1990). 
22. Troy, Public Sector Unionism: The Rising Power Center of Organized Labor, 9 GOVT. 
UNION REv. Summer 1988, at 1, 3. The percentage of the public sector that is unionized de-
creased to 36% in 1987. Id. at 3. 
23. Id. 
24. For a discussion of the effects of collective bargaining and unionization on employee 
rights, see A. REES, THE EcoNOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 186-87 (2d ed. 1977) (Unions protect 
employees from abuses of managerial authority.); Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Union-
ism, PUB. INT., Fall 1979, at 71-74, 78, 82 (Unions provide workers with a means of communi-
cating with management. In addition, as a result of collective bargaining, unionized workers 
make about 10-15% more than otherwise comparable nonunion workers and are much more 
likely to receive important fringe benefits like pensions and life and health insurance.). 
25. See Troy, supra note 22, at 7. 
26. See id. at 1, 7. 
27. 4 D. WOLLETT & D. SEARS, LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ix (1971). 
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and addresses to unions representing federal employees is clear. Fail-
ure to disclose this information could seriously hamper union efforts 
to represent employees effectively, thereby decreasing the force of or-
ganized labor in the federal public sector. Indeed, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) focused on this concern when requiring the 
routine release of employee names and addresses by private-sector em-
ployers during union organizational campaigns. The NLRB noted: 
As a practical matter, an employer, through his possession of em-
ployee names and home addresses as well as his ability to communicate 
with employees on plant premises, is assured of the continuing opportu-
nity to inform the entire electorate of his views with respect to union 
representation. On the other hand, without a list of employee names and 
addresses, a labor organization, whose organizers normally have no right 
of access to plant premises, has no method by which it can be certain of 
reaching all the employees with its arguments in favor of representation, 
and, as a result, employees are often completely unaware of that point of 
view .... In other words, by providing all parties with employees' names 
and addresses, we maximize the likelihood that all the voters will be 
exposed to the arguments for, as well as against, union representation.28 
Employee names and addresses are equally necessary for effective 
union representation in the public sector.29 As the Eighth Circuit 
noted in United States Department of Agriculture v. FLRA, 30 "direct 
communication with employees at home without the possibility of in-
terference by management will best serve the purposes underlying the 
[Fed. L-M Statute]."31 Moreover, the need for employee names and 
addresses continues despite the fact that federal sector unions have 
generally initiated their requests after being certified as the exclusive 
bargaining representative. Thus, direct communication with employ-
ees is equally necessary for collective bargaining both before and after 
the election campaign. When commenting on this fact in United 
States Department of Health and Human Services v. FLRA, 32 the 
Fourth Circuit observed, "[c]ommunication between the [u]nion and 
bargaining unit employees appears to be as important to the perform-
ance of the [u]nion's representational duties in the interim between 
negotiations as it is during negotiations."33 
Given the increasing significance of public sector unionization and 
given that employee names and addresses are necessary for effective 
collective bargaining, resolution of whether the Privacy Act bars re-
28. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240-41 (1966). 
29. See supra note 4. 
30. 836 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded, 488 U.S. 1025, vacated as moot, 
876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989). 
31. 836 F.2d at 1142. 
32. 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988). 
33. 833 F.2d at 1132. 
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lease of this information is particularly important. The remainder of 
this Note focuses on this question. 
II. PRE-DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY DECISIONS 
As noted above, prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in FLRA v. 
United States Department of the Treasury, with the exception of the 
Fourth Circuit, 34 every circuit court to address the issue held in favor 
of disclosure when deciding whether the Privacy Act prohibited re-
lease of employee names and addresses to a union. 35 Although gener-
ally the courts required disclosure, their reasoning differed. This Part 
examines chronologically the various rationales and tests advanced in 
the circuit court opinions prior to Department of the Treasury. 
In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1923 v. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, 36 the Fourth 
Circuit was first to consider whether FOIA requires disclosure of em-
ployee names and addresses to a union. Unlike subsequent cases in-
volving this issue, the union requested disclosure of the names and 
home addresses directly under FOIA and not under the Fed. L-M 
Statute. The employer refused to release the addresses, arguing that to 
do so would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy" under FOIA's Exemption 6. ' 
To determine whether government information falls within Ex-
emption 6, Congress requires that courts balance the public and per-
sonal privacy interests at stake. 37 After weighing these factors, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that employees have a "strong" privacy in-
terest in their home addresses because "[d]isclosure could subject 
[them] to an unchecked barrage of mailings and ... personal solicita-
tions [and because] no effective restraints could be placed on the range 
of uses to which the information, once revealed, might be put."38 On 
the public interest side of the equation, the court found that while 
34. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text for a description of the Fourth Circuit 
decision. 
35. See supra note 15 for citations to the circuit court opinions. 
36. 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983). 
37. When drafting FOIA, Congress did not provide a blanket exemption for information 
which fell within Exemption 6. Rather, the Senate and House Reports reveal that Congress 
intended that the individual's right to privacy be balanced against the public's interest in disclo-
sure. The Senate Report states, "The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' 
enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individ-
ual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to 
governmental information." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 [hereinafter SENATE RE-
PORT 813]. Similarly, the House Report notes, "[t]he limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy' provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's 
right of privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information .... " 
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 [hereinafter HousE REPORT 1497], reprinted in 
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2428. The Supreme Court first applied the 
balancing test in United States Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976). 
38. 712 F.2d at 932. 
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"collective bargaining is a matter of grave public concern, any benefits 
flowing from disclosure . . . would inure primarily to the union, in a 
proprietary sense, rather than to the public at large."39 The court also 
stated, in language foreshadowing Department of the Treasury, that 
the requested records were not the kind that must be disclosed under 
FOIA. The court noted: 
The purpose of the Act is " 'to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy 
and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny .... '" The 
home addresses sought by [the union] have nothing to do with the 
agency's 'work,' and disclosure thereof would shed no significant light on 
the agency's inner workings.40 
The union was therefore not entitled to disclosure of the employees' 
home addresses. 
In dissent, Judge Winter observed: 
With rare exception, there is little privacy in one's name and home ad-
dress. Such information is a matter of public record in motor vehicle 
registration and licensing records, voting lists, and real property records. 
Other sources from which it may often be obtained are telephone direc-
. tories and city directories. In short, it is the rare individual who has any 
real privacy interest in the identity of his residence.41 
Judge Winter did not view FOIA's disclosure requirements as lim-
ited solely to "opening agency action to the light of public scrutiny." 
Rather, he argued the Fed. L-M Statute was a congressional determi-
nation that collective bargaining is in the public interest. Because the 
union could not satisfactorily communicate with all the employees in 
its bargaining unit without their names and addresses, Judge Winter 
concluded that disclosure of the addresses would be in the interest of 
the union, and in turn in the public interest.42 
In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1760 v. 
FLRA, 43 the Second Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion. 
As in Local 1923, the union requested the names and addresses of all 
employees in the bargaining unit. The union in Local 1760, however, 
initiated its request under the Fed. L-M Statute and not directly under 
FOIA. The employer released the employee names but argued that 
the Privacy Act barred disclosure of the addresses. 44 In response, the 
union asserted that the FOIA exception to the Privacy Act required 
disclosure since release of the requested information would not consti-
tute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" under Ex-
39. 712 F.2d at 932. 
40. 712 F.2d at 933 (quoting United States Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361). 
41. 712 F.2d at 934 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
42. 712 F.2d at 934 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
43. 786 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1986). 
44. The Privacy Act applies here because the records at issue are contained within a "system 
of records" as defined by the meaning of the Act. See supra note 6 for the relevant statutory text. 
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emption 6.45 Thus, although the case reached the court by way of the 
Fed. L-M Statute, the Second Circuit was forced to address basically 
the same question the Fourth Circuit had decided earlier. 
The Second Circuit agreed with the union, finding the privacy in-
terest of the average employee "not particularly compelling" given the 
ready availability of addresses through other public records.46 In ad-
dition, the court noted that the union already had access to other in-
formation, such as employee salary levels, which could more easily 
threaten personal privacy.47 
In weighing the public interest, the court held that the mere availa-
bility to the union of alternative means of communication did not jus-
tify the employer's refusal to release the addresses, particularly since 
an administrative law judge had already found those means inade-
quate. 48 The court also pointed out that in private sector cases, the 
existence of alternatives did not preclude disclosure.49 Finally, in re-
sponse to the employer's argument that the release of the addresses 
would not serve the public interest, the Second Circuit noted that Con-
gress had determined, when enacting the Fed. L-M Statute, that col-
lective bargaining was in the public interest. so In so doing, the court 
implicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's narrow interpretation ofFOIA 
45. 786 F.2d at 556. Before appeal to the Second Circuit, an administrative law judge ruled 
in favor of the union after noting that the addresses were crucial to the union's ability to frame 
proposals for collective bargaining and that other means of communication open to the union 
were inadequate. 786 F.2d at 555. The FLRA, which is the public sector equivalent to the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), overruled the administrative law judge and held that 
the Privacy Act prevented disclosure of the requested information. 19 F.L.R.A. No. 108 (Aug. 
22, 1985); 786 F.2d at 555. The FLRA drew support from the Fourth Circuit's decision in Local 
1923. The FLRA concluded that the strong privacy interest of the employees in their home 
addresses outweighed the union's need for disclosure. After Local 1760, however, the FLRA 
reversed this stance and has since consistently held that employers must release employee names 
and addresses. For a description of the FLRA and its duties, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104-7105 (1988). 
46. 786 F.2d at 556. But see infra text accompanying notes 81-82 (noting that in United 
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press the Supreme 
Court held that an individual may have a privacy interest in public information). 
47. 786 F.2d at 556. 
48. See United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated 
and remanded, 488 U.S. 1025, vacated as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989) (Although adequate 
alternative means existed, "direct communication with employees at home without the possibility 
of interference by management will best serve the purposes underlying the labor statute."); 
United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129, 1133 (4th Cir. 1987), 
cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1990) (mere existence of other means of communication insufficient 
to rebut presumption of union need for employee names and addresses); supra note 37. 
49. The court stated that "the privacy implications of address release are essentially the same 
in either the public or private sector." 786 F.2d at 557. For private sector cases allowing disclo-
sure when alternative means exist, see United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1205-06 
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 993 (1971); Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969). 
50. 786 F.2d at 557; see American Fedn. of Govt. Employees, Local 1923 v. United States 
Dept. of Health and Human Serv., supra text accompanying notes 41-42 (Winter, J., dissenting); 
United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d at 1143 (noting that § 7101(a)(l) of the Fed. L-
M Statute promotes the public interest by protecting the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively); supra text accompanying notes 19-20. 
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and implied that the Act's purpose may be broader than merely pro-
viding a mechanism for public scrutiny of agency action. Because of 
the "modest" privacy interest involved and the strong public interest 
in collective bargaining, the court concluded that disclosure of the em-
ployees' addresses was not "prohibited by law" within the meaning of 
the Fed. L-M Statute.st 
The Fourth Circuit.reconsidered the applicability of Exemption 6 
to the disclosure of employee names and addresses in United States 
Department of Health and Human Services v. FLRA. 52 In this case, 
the union sought release of the names and addresses through the Fed. 
L-M Statute and not directly under FOIA as its counterpart had done 
in Local 1923. 53 The employer refused to release the addresses, argu-
ing that the Privacy Act prohibited disclosure. 
The court distinguished Local 1923, and affirmed an earlier FLRA 
ruling requiring disclosure. 54 The court emphasized that the case at 
hand did not involve a request for information brought directly under 
FOIA, but rather concerned a FLRA ruling on a request brought 
under the Fed. L-M Statute. Because the suit arose under the labor 
statute, the court stated, "[c]onsiderable weight is due the Authority's 
interpretation of the [Fed. L-M Statute] .... [A]lthough this matter 
involves the Authority's interpretation of statutes other than its en-
abling act, we perceive that the interpretation bears directly on the 
'complexities' of federal labor relations and we accordingly defer to 
the Authority's rulings."55 Thus, by focusing on the procedural pos-
ture of the case and by deferring to the FLRA, the Fourth Circuit 
finessed its way around its earlier determination in Local 1923. 
In United States Department of Agriculture v. FLRA, S6 the Eighth 
Circuit questioned whether the privacy interests of employees should 
receive little "solicitude" solely because the information could usually 
be obtained from other sources. While generally agreeing with the 
Second and Fourth Circuits' conclusion that a union is entitled to em-
ployee home addresses when requested under the Fed. L-M Statute, 
51. 786 F.2d at 557. 
52.- 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988). 
53. 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
54. The court stated, "[w]e find that the Authority has, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4), 
properly applied the FOIA balancing test and we find no error in its conclusion that disclosure is 
warranted under the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act." 833 F.2d at 1135. 
55. 833 F.2d at 1135. But see United States Dept. of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1134 
(3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988) ("[N]o deference is owed an agency's interpretation 
of a general statute .... We will ... give considerable deference to the FLRA's reading of the 
Fed'l L-M Statute, but will not grant it any presumption of special expertise in applying the 
Privacy Act or FOIA."). In Department of Navy, however, the Third Circuit ultimately held in 
favor of disclosure. Thus, deference was not critical to the outcome in that case. For a more 
detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's decision, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
56. 836 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded, 488 U.S. 1025, vacated as moot, 
876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989). 
February 1991] Note - Employee Information 989 
the court nonetheless believed that employees have a "cognizable" pri-
vacy interest in their home addresses:57 
"That society recognizes the individual's interest in keeping his address 
private is indicated in such practices as non-listing of telephone numbers 
and the renting of post office boxes." Furthermore, while we might not 
violently disagree with the Second Circuit's statement that the average 
employee's privacy interest in his home address is not particularly com-
pelling, not all employees are "average." Some may well have more 
compelling interests in privacy which are entitled to protection. 58 
Despite this concern, the court concluded that the "interests in pri-
vacy and disclosure will be optimally served by requiring disclosure of 
the names and addresses of only those employees who do not request 
their employers ... keep the information confidential."59 
The union disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's determination that 
individual employees could request that their names be kept confiden-
tial and sought a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.60 
Before the Supreme Court considered the merits of the case, however, 
the defendant governmental agencies promulgated regulations requir-
ing disclosure of all employee names and home addresses. 61 In con-
trast to the Eighth Circuit's opinion, the regulations did not permit 
individual employees to prevent disclosure even if they so desired. Ev-
idently, the Department was persuaded by court decisions granting 
full disclosure in other circuits. 62 
The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit's judgment and re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of the regulations. 63 
On remand, the court of appeals dismissed the petitions for review64 
57. 836 F.2d at 1143. 
58. 836 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 n.15 (3d 
Cir. 1974)). 
59. 836 F.2d at 1144. But see 836 F.2d at 1145 (Lay, C.J., dissenting in part) (Chief Judge 
Lay argued that no legal authority supports a ruling requiring disclosure of the names of those 
employees who do not request that the information be kept confidential. "The court must decide 
whether disclosure is prohibited by law, because that is the only statutory circumstance in which 
disclosure is not required."). 
60. United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1988), petition for cert 
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1988) (No. 88-349). 
61. 53 Fed. Reg. 39,629, 44,513-44,514 (1988). 
62. Id. at 39,629 ("In a number of judicial proceedings, it has been held that bargaining unit 
representatives' access to the names and addresses of bargaining unit employees was necessary to 
union representation of those employees, and that agencies must disclose such information, upon 
request, pursuant to [the Fed. L-M Statute] and [FOIA]."). The regulations cited United States 
Dept. of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); United 
States Dept. of Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1988); United Assn. of Journeymen, 
Local 598 v. Department of the Army, 841 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1988); United States Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987), cert dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 
(1988); and American Fedn. of Govt. Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 
1986). See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third and Seventh 
Circuit opinions. 
63. FLRA v. United States Dept. of Agric., 488 U.S. 1025 (1989). 
64. United States Dept. of Agric. v. FLRA, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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observing, "[t]he [agencies] appear satisfied that the legality offull dis-
closure has been established and by all indications are willing to 
comply."65 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States Department of the Air Force 
v. FLRA, 66 was next to consider whether FOIA requires disclosure of 
employee names and addresses. Although the case was brought under 
the Fed. L-M Statute, the court treated it as though the union had 
sought disclosure solely under FOIA. Thus, when holding in favor of 
disclosure, the court determined that FOIA would compel release of 
the names and addresses independent of the Fed. L-M Statute.67 
In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit invoked a more 
limited balancing test in contrast to the previous courts that had ad-
dressed the issue. The court stated: 
We do not believe that the phrase "public interest" as used in the balanc-
ing in Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the Act, m.eans anything more or less 
than the general disclosure policies of the statute. Since Congress gave 
us no standard against which to judge the public interest in disclosure, 
we do not believe Congress intended the federal judiciary-when apply-
ing ... Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the Act-to construct its own hierar-
chy of the public interest in disclosure of particular information .... [A 
court should balance interests only to] consider whether there is a cogni-
zable privacy interest in the information sought, and then appraise the 
impairment to that interest that would result from disclosure. 68 
Applying this approach, the court determined that although employ-
ees do have a privacy interest in their names and addresses, release of 
the information to the union would only slightly impair this interest. 
The court therefore required disclosure, recognizing that collective 
bargaining served the public interest and that this interest was prop-
erly within the scope of FOIA. 
Finally, in United States Department of Navy v. FLRA, 69 the last 
relevant case before the Supreme Court decided Reporters Committee, 
the Third Circuit held that the Fed. L-M Statute required disclosure 
of employee addresses. The court began with a presumption in favor 
of disclosure, a position necessary in any balancing of the public inter-
est in disclosure and the privacy interests of employees. 70 With this 
65. 876 F.2d at 52. 
66. 838 F.2d 229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988). 
67. 838 F.2d at 231-33. The court thus rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Local 
1923, discussed supra at notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
68. 838 F.2d at 233 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Department of 
Justice, 831 F.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1987), revd. on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989)). 
69. 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988). 
70. 840 F.2d at 1135-36. In drafting FOIA, Congress sought to secure for the public the 
maximum disclosure possible. When commenting on the balancing of public and private inter-
ests, the drafters noted that "[i]t is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not 
an impossible one either .... Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, 
balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure." 
SENATE REPORT 813, supra note 37, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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presumption in mind, the court then considered the employer's argu-
ment that collective bargaining was not the kind of interest served by 
FOIA because it did not help the public to scrutinize government ac-
tivity. Rejecting this narrow interpretation of the public interest, the 
court noted that Congress, in enacting the Fed. L-M Statute, ex-
pressed its view that collective bargaining was in the public interest. 
The court thus concluded that "if disclosure ... will further collective 
bargaining, such disclosure would be in the public interest. "71 
When weighing the employees' privacy concerns, the Third Circuit 
recognized that individuals generally have a "meaningful" interest in 
their home addresses which merits some protection.72 Nonetheless, 
after balancing the public and private interests, the court determined 
that disclosure of this information would not constitute such a "clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" as to be prohibited by Ex-
emption 6. Thus, since FOIA required release of the addresses, the 
Privacy Act did not bar disclosure. 73 
As this summary of cases indicates, prior to the D.C. Circuit's de-
cision in Department of the Treasury, the circuit courts agreed that the 
Privacy Act did not bar disclosure of employee names and addresses 
when requested by a certified union under the Fed. L-M Statute.74 
While the courts recognized that employees have some privacy interest 
in their names and addresses, they also believed that the impairment to 
this interest did not outweigh the congressionally recognized public 
interest in collective bargaining. As a result, release of employee 
names and addresses would not constitute a "clearly unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy" under Exemption 6. Accordingly, the 
courts reasoned that FOIA required disclosure. 
Yet, although these circuit courts concluded that collective bar-
gaining is in the public interest and that the disclosure of employee 
names and addresses outweighs an employee's privacy interest, the 
question remains whether collective bargaining is the type of public 
interest served by FOIA. While the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits answered this question affirmatively, the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Department of the Treasury, following the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Reporters Committee, held otherwise. The arguments on 
both sides of the current debate on this issue can best be understood 
through analysis of Reporters Committee and Department of the 
Treasury. 
71. 840 F.2d at 1136; see supra note 50 for citations to other court opinions expressing this 
conclusion. 
72. 840 F.2d at 1136. 
73. 840 F.2d at 1137. 
74. Recall that in United States Dept of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, the Fourth Circuit 
ultimately distinguished its earlier ruling in Local 1923, where disclosure had been sought di-
rectly under FOIA and not under the Fed. L-M Statute. See supra notes 52-55 and accompany-
ing text. 
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III. REPORTERS COMMI1TEE AND THE APPLICATION OF FOIA IN 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Until recently, the circuit court decisions discussed in Part II ap-
peared to establish with certainty that FOIA required disclosure of 
employee names and addresses when a union requested this informa-
tion under the Fed. L-M Statute. The Supreme Court's interpretation 
of FOIA in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press and the D.C. Circuit's subsequent decision 
in FLRA v. United States Department of the Treasury, however, cast 
doubt on this conclusion. This Part begins by examining Reporters 
Committee and concludes by exploring the problems resulting from 
the D.C. Circuit's application ofFOIA in Department of the Treasury. 
In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court held that Exemption 
7(C)75 of FOIA categorically prevents disclosure of FBI "rap 
sheets."76 Exemption 7(C) excludes from disclosure "records or infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [the release of 
which] could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy."77 In Reporters Committee, a CBS news 
correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
requested information concerning the rap sheets of Charles Medico. 
A company owned by Medico's family, Medico Industries, allegedly 
had obtained a number of defense contracts from a corrupt congress-
man. 78 The Reporters Committee argued that any record of bribery, 
embezzlement, or other financial crimes committed by Charles Medico 
would potentially be of special public interest. The Department of 
Justice asserted that it had no record of any financial crimes concern-
ing Medico and refused to comment on whether it had any informa-
tion regarding nonfinancial crimes. 79 
The Supreme Court held in favor of the Justice Department. so In 
denying release of the requested information, the Court balanced 
Medico's privacy interest in nondisclosure against the public interest 
to be furthered by release of the rap sheets. The Court rejected the 
Reporters Committee's contention that Medico's privacy interest was 
"nil" because the information contained in the rap sheets had previ-
ously been disclosed to the public. In so doing, the Court asserted that 
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988). Because Exemption 7(C) covered the case, the Court did 
not address the applicability of Exemption 6. United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1475 (1989). 
76. Rap sheets contain descriptive information about an individual. Among other things, the 
sheets include an individual's date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as history of 
arrests, charges, convictions, and incarcerations. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(4) (1988). 
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988). For analysis of the differences between Exemptions 6 
and 7(C), see infra text accompanying notes 139-41. 
78. 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1481 (1989). 
79. 109 S. Ct. at 1473. 
80. 109 S. Ct. at 1475. 
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just because "an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean that an 
individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the 
information."81 Moreover, the Court observed, "[a]lmost every ... 
fact, however personal or sensitive, is known to someone else. Mean-
ingful discussion of privacy, therefore, requires the recognition that 
ordinarily we deal not with an interest in total nondisclosure, but with 
an interest in selective disclosure."82 After also considering the nature 
of the information to be revealed, the Court concluded that Medico 
had a "substantial" interest in the privacy of his rap sheets. 83 
The Court next considered whether disclosure "could reasonably 
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy" under Exemption 7(C). The Court stated that this determina-
tion did not tum on the purposes for which the information was 
requested, 84 but rather on "the nature of the requested document and 
its relationship to 'the basic purpose of the [FOIA]' to open agency 
action to the light of public scrutiny."85 Given this interpretation of 
FOIA, the Court reasoned that while Medico's rap sheets could con-
ceivably provide information newsworthy enough to be included in a 
news story, this interest alone did not help the public scrutinize agency 
activity.86 Thus, because the public interest served by disclosure of the 
81. 109 S. Ct at 1480 (quoting Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with 
Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of Kansas 
Law School, pt. l, p. 13 (Sept. 26-27, 1974)). 
82. 109 S. Ct. at 1476 n.14 (quoting Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy 
and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 343-44 (1966)). 
This statement supports the argument that, in the collective bargaining context, employees may 
have a privacy interest in their names and addresses even though this information may be pub-
licly available, for example, in the telephone directory. The question remains, however, whether 
this interest in privacy is outweighed by the public interest in collective bargaining. 
83. The Court found that the "substantial character of [this] interest [was] affected by the 
fact that in today's society, the computer can accumulate and store information that would 
otherwise have surely been forgotten long before •.. rap sheets are discarded." 109 S. Ct. at 
1480. 
84. The Court stated, "the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his 
or her FOIA request ..•• Congress 'clearly intended,' the FOIA 'to give any member of the public 
as much a right to disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular document]' .... The 
Act's sole concern is with what must be made public or not made public." 109 S. Ct. at 1480-81 
(quoting respectively NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); Davis, The 
Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 761, 765 (1966-67)). 
In the context of this Note, the unions are not arguing that the identity of the requester 
should alter the disclosure interest, but rather that the disclosure mandate in the Fed. L-M Stat-
ute might do so. Thus, the focus has not been on the fact that a Union is doing the requesting, 
but rather on the fact that Congress has recognized that collective bargaining is in the public 
interest and has provided for the disclosure of all information necessary to promote this interest. 
See, e.g., FLRA v. United States· Dept. of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 863 {1990). 
85. 109 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 
(1976)). 
86. The Court stated: 
[I]f Medico [had] ... been arrested or convicted ... that information would neither aggra-
vate nor mitigate his allegedly improper relationship with the Congressman; more specifi-
cally, it would tell us nothing directly about the character of the Congressman's behavior. 
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rap sheets did not fall within the public interest that FOIA seeks to 
promote, disclosure "could reasonably constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of privacy" under Exemption 7(C). 
In Department of the Treasury, 87 the D.C. Circuit applied the rea-
soning of Reporters Committee in the collective bargaining context and 
concluded that Exemption 6 prohibits release of employee names and 
addresses to a union. 88 The court first determined that the employees' 
privacy interests outweighed any benefits to be gained from disclosure 
since collective bargaining did not fall within FOIA's central purpose 
of opening government activity to public scrutiny. 89 
The court then addressed whether this balance should be altered in 
light of the fact that Congress, in the Fed. L-M Statute, had estab-
lished an additional public interest in disclosure.90 The court rejected 
this approach, finding that the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure unless 
FOIA alone requires release.91 The court feared that if it considered 
the disclosure interest embodied in the Fed. L-M Statute, the Privacy 
Act would be read to exempt information obtainable "under FOIA or 
any agency decision based on a disclosure-related statute. "92 Alterna-
tively, the court asserted that consideration of other interests might 
extend the FOIA exemption to the Privacy Act to situations "where 
the disclosure value under FOIA, and under any congressionally au-
thorized agency disclosure decision, in the aggregate outweigh[ed] the 
privacy interest."93 Because the Privacy Act refers only to an exemp-
tion under FOIA, the court concluded it was not "entitled to engage in 
Nor would it tell us anything about the conduct of the Department of Defense (DOD) in 
awarding •.. contracts to the Medico Company. Arguably a FOIA request to the DOD for 
records relating to those contracts, or for documents describing the agency's procedures, if 
any, for determining whether officers of a prospective contractor have criminal records, 
would constitute an appropriate request for "official information." 
109 S. Ct. at 1482. 
87. 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990). 
88. 884 F.2d at 1456. In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court held that Exemption 7(C) 
prevented disclosure. The D.C. Circuit extended Reporters Committee to Exemption 6 by noting 
that "[ w ]hite [E]xemption 6 precludes only a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,' 
that difference between it and [E]xemption 7(C) goes only to the weight of the privacy interest 
needed to outweigh disclosure." 884 F.2d at 1451-52. 
89. 884 F.2d at 1451-53. 
90. The court stated that according to Reporters Committee, "the identity of the requesting 
party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request." 884 F.2d at 1453 (quoting 
Reporters Committee, 109 S. Ct. at 1480). Yet, the court went on to note: 
[T]he statement does not necessarily mean that there is no exception to the general rule that 
the public interest in disclosure under FOIA should be defined exclusively in terms of find· 
ing out what the "government is up to." Nothing in the passage suggests that the Court had 
considered and rejected the relevance of public interest objectives identified by Congress in 
other disclosure statutes. 
884 F.2d at 1453. The D.C. Circuit, however, found that it could not square this broad view of 
FOIA with the language of the Privacy Act. 
91. 884 F.2d at 1453. 
92. 884 F.2d at 1453. 
93. 884 F.2d at 1453. 
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the sort of imaginative reconstruction that would be necessary [in or-
der] to introduce collective bargaining values into the balancing 
process."94 
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred. While stating that the 
court's logic was "irreproachable,"95 Judge Ginsburg nonetheless ex-
pressed three concerns with the court's holding. First, she asserted 
that Congress probably did not intend to deny public sector unions 
information that is routinely available to unions in the private sector.96 
Next, Judge Ginsburg pointed out that the result in Reporters 
Committee is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts. 97 In Tax Analysts, the 
Court held that FOIA required the Department of Justice to disclose 
its compilations of district court tax decisions to publishers of a weekly 
magazine.9s Although Tax Analysts did not involve a FOIA privacy 
exemption, Judge Ginsburg nonetheless observed: 
The juxtaposition of Tax Analysts and [our decision today] reveals a ten-
sion in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FOIA: the Informa-
tion Act, in the first instance, demands no showing at all of "public 
interest"; yet, once a privacy interest, however modest, is implicated, the 
Act forbids disclosure of information that advances a significant public 
interest (here, the interest in informed collective bargaining), if that in-
terest is unrelated to FOIA's "core purpose."99 
Finally, Judge Ginsburg contended "the most persuasive indica-
tion" that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court anticipated the 
result in Department of the Treasury lay in the fact that when viewed 
"unfiltered by the lens of Reporters Committee," the balance between 
the public interest in disclosure and the individual's interest in privacy 
94. 884 F.2d at 1453. Richard Posner used the phrase "imaginative reconstruction" to de-
scribe an alternative method of statutory interpretation. Under this two-part approach, instead 
of strictly applying the canons of construction when analyzing a statute, a judge should first 
attempt to place herself "in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would 
have wanted the statute applied" to the dispute before her. If this initial approach fails, then the 
judge must decide what "attribution of meaning" to the statute will produce the most reasonable 
result from the viewpoint of the enacting legislator. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CRISES AND REFORM 286-87 (1985). 
95. Judge Ginsburg observed, "[t]he broad cross-reference in 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) - 'to the 
extent not prohibited by law' - picks up the Privacy Act unmodified .... " 884 F.2d at 1457 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
96. See supra text accompanying note 28. Judge Ginsburg asserted, "the public interest in 
the bargaining representative's ready access to unit employees appears no less vital in federal 
employment than in private employment." 884 F.2d at 1458 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). 
Moreover, she noted that "[p]rivate sector labor-relations case law ... provides strong guidance 
in parallel public sector matters. This is so because Congress modeled the [Fed. L-M Statute] on 
the Labor Management Relations Act." 884 F.2d at 1458 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted). 
97. 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989); see infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text for a more com-
plete discussion of Tax Analysts. 
98. 109 S. Ct. at 2853. 
99. 884 F.2d at 1459 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). 
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"overwhelmingly favors disclosure."100 Judge Ginsburg argued that 
the privacy interest involved in the release of the names and addresses 
of bargaining unit employees was much less compelling than that in-
volved in Reporters Committee and other cases where disclosure was 
prohibited. 101 She noted, "the list[s] would reveal nothing more than 
the name, address, and bargaining unit of each individual. . . . [N]o 
additional, personal information [such as pay levels] that might be em-
barrassing or enhance the value of the list for solicitation purposes" 
would be disclosed.102 In addition, Judge Ginsburg observed that in 
all but one instance where the circuit courts concluded that an individ-
ual's privacy interest in her name and address was sufficient to bar 
disclosure, the requested information would have imparted more "re-
vealing and commercially valuable" information.103 Given that the 
balance of public and private interests strongly favored disclosure and 
given the Supreme Court's seemingly inconsistent application of 
FOIA, Judge Ginsburg argued for either a qualification of Reporters 
Committee or a congressional broadening of the disclosure provisions 
of the Fed. L-M Statute.104 
The decisions in Reporters Committee and Department of the 
Treasury suggest that the FOIA exception to the Privacy Act may not 
require disclosure of employee names and addresses for collective bar-
gaining purposes in the federal public sector. In Reporters Committee, 
the Supreme Court made clear that FOIA's primary purpose was to 
ensure that government activity be open to public scrutiny, and that 
the weight of an individual's privacy interest depended in part on 
whether disclosure would further this goal. Applying this formulation 
in Department of the Treasury, the D.C. Circuit determined that col-
lective bargaining did not serve this purpose. Thus, the court held 
that a federal agency was not required to disclose employees names 
and addresses to a union. 
This issue, however, is far from resolved. As Judge Ginsburg 
pointed out, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court could have an-
ticipated the result in Department of the Treasury. 105 Because logi-
cally public sector unions should not be treated differently from 
private sector unions, at least in regards to the release of employee 
100. 884 F.2d at 1459 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). 
101. 884 F.2d at 1460 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). 
102. 884 F.2d at 1460 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). 
103. 884 F.2d at 1459·60 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). 
104. 884 F.2d at 1461 (Ginsburg, R., J., concurring). Apparently Judge Ginsburg concurred 
because she agreed with the court's argument that the only public interest to be served by FOIA 
is that of helping the public to scrutinize government activity and that the Act does not promote 
public interests recognized in other disclosure statutes. Under this mode of analysis, FOIA 
would not require release of employee names and addresses. The Privacy Act would therefore 
bar disclosure and release would be "prohibited by law" within the meaning of the Fed. L-M 
Statute. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
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names and addresses, 106 the D.C. Circuit's application of Reporters 
Committee warrants further analysis. 
Reporters Committee and Department of the Treasury deserve 
closer scrutiny for an additional reason. Although FOIA's central or 
basic purpose may be to open government activity to public scrutiny, 
the Act may seek to promote other interests as well. By narrowly 
interpreting Reporters Committee and FOIA, the D.C. Circuit may be 
foreclosing consideration of other important congressionally identified 
public interests - such as the interest in collective bargaining recog-
nized in the Fed. L-M Statute. This Note now turns to consideration 
of this issue. 
IV. FOIA AND DISCLOSURE OF EMPLOYEE NAMES AND 
ADDRESSES 
As noted above, when applying United States Department of Jus-
tice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom ·of the Press in FLRA v. De-
partment of the Treasury, the D.C. Circuit concluded that when 
disclosure would invade personal privacy, FOIA only requires release 
of that information which aids public scrutiny of government activity. 
Because collective bargaining does not further this purpose, the court 
prohibited disclosure of employee names and addresses to the union. 
Neither Reporters Committee nor the history of FOIA, however, re-
quire that the Act's disclosure provisions be read so narrowly. After 
examining FOIA's legislative history and case law interpreting the 
Act, this Part argues that FOIA may promote public interests embod-
ied in other disclosure statutes. This Part concludes by demonstrating 
that under an Exemption 6 balancing test, the release of employee 
names and addresses does not constitute a "clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy." 
A. Interpreting FOIA 's Purpose 
In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court stated that whether 
FOIA warrants disclosure turns not on the identity of the requesting 
party, but rather on "the nature of the requested document and its 
relationship to the 'basic purpose of [FOIA] to open agency action to 
the light of public scrutiny.' " 107 The D.C. Circuit noted, in Depart-
ment of the Treasury, that the Supreme Court did.not necessarily man-
date that the public interest in disclosure always be defined in terms of 
the "watchdog" function. Rather, the court observed that nothing in 
the Supreme Court's formulation suggested that the Court had "con-
sidered and rejected the relevance of public interest objectives identi-
106. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33. 
107. United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 109 S. 
Ct. 1468, 1480-81 (1989) (quoting United States Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 
(1976)). 
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fied by Congress in other disclosure statutes."1os 
Yet, while appearing to recognize that FOIA may promote public 
interests embodied in other disclosure statutes, the D.C. Circuit none-
theless rejected the FLRA's contention that the Fed. L-M Statute was 
evidence of a public interest in collective bargaining that Congress 
thought should be considered when balancing under Exemption 6. 109 
By refusing to take account of this public interest, the court in effect 
concluded that FOIA's sole purpose is to promote the watchdog 
interest. 
The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of FOIA and Reporters Commit-
tee may not have been accurate. The court asserted that consideration 
of the public interest and the disclosure provisions in the Fed. L-M 
Statute would in effect cause the FOIA exemption to the Privacy Act 
to encompass disclosures required "under FOIA or any agency deci-
sion based on a disclosure-related statute." 110 Yet, if FOIA has multi-
ple purposes, then the Act's disclosure provisions, taken alone, can 
legitimately promote interests embodied in other disclosure statutes, 
like the Fed. L-M Statute. Through examination ofFOIA's legislative 
history and case law interpreting the statute, this section seeks to un-
cover the proper scope of FOIA. 
1. FOIA~ Legislative History 
Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 as an amendment to the public 
information section of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). 111 
The AP A was originally enacted to ensure public access to govern-
ment information.112 By 1966, however, the Act had become "the ma-
jor statutory excuse for withholding government records from public 
view."113 Congress drafted FOIA in order to close the "loopholes 
which allow[ed] agencies to deny legitimate information to the 
public."114 
108. 884 F.2d at 1453. 
109. 884 F.2d at 1453. 
110. 884 F.2d at 1453. 
111. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (originally codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964)). 
112. See HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 37, at 3, reprinted at 2420. 
113. HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 37, at 3, reprinted at 2420; see also SENATE REPORT 
813, supra note 37, at 3 ("[T]he Administrative Procedure Act has been used more as an excuse 
for withholding than as a disclosure statute."). The major flaws with the APA were succinctly 
stated in the congressional debates by Representative Moss, who observed: 
The law now permits withholding of Federal Government records if secrecy is required "in 
the public interest" or if the records relate "solely to the internal management of an 
agency." Government information also may be held confidential "for good cause found," 
Even if no good cause can be found for secrecy, the records will be made available only to 
"persons properly and directly concerned." These phrases are the warp and woof of the 
blanket of secrecy which can cover the day-to-day administrative actions of the Federal 
agencies. 
112 CONG. REc. 13,642 (1966) (statement of Rep. Moss). 
114. SENATE REPORT 813, supra note 37, at 3. 
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Although FOIA's legislative history supports the view that a cen-
tral purpose of the Act is to ensure that government activity be open 
to public scrutiny, 115 no congressional statements support that this 
was the sole aim of the Act's disclosure provisions. Rather, the gen-
eral philosophy behind FOIA's enactment appears to have been a 
commitment to increase generally public access to government infor-
mation by providing for the fullest possible disclosure.116 Indeed, 
Congress explicitly provided in section 552(c) that nothing in the Act 
should be read to "authorize withholding of information or limit the 
availability of records to the public, except as specifically 
stated .... " 117 This section provides additional support for a broad 
interpretation of FOIA's disclosure provisions.11s 
The type of information Congress was concerned about when 
drafting the Act also supports a broad vision of disclosure under 
FOIA. The House Report lists the following as examples of cases 
where information had been improperly withheld under the APA: (1) 
the National Science Foundation's decision not to disclose cost esti-
mates submitted by unsuccessful contractors; (2) the Secretary of 
Navy's refusal to release telephone directories; and (3) the Postmaster 
General's refusal to disclose names and salaries of postal employees.119 
The watchdog theory does not justify disclosure in all of these 
instances. 
As the above analysis shows, FOIA's legislative history does not 
support the contention that the watchdog function is the only public 
interest to be served by disclosure. Rather, the Act's history reveals 
that Congress was concerned with promoting the maximum disclosure 
115. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 37, at 12, reprinted at 2429 (FOIA "provides 
the necessary machinery to assure the availability of Government information necessary to an 
informed electorate"); SENATE REPORT 813, supra note 37, at 5 ("[t]he public as a whole has a 
right to know what its Government is doing."); 112 CONG. REc. 13,641 (1966) (statement of 
Rep. Moss) ("We must remove every barrier to information about - and understanding of -
Government activities consistent with our security if the American public is to be adequately 
equipped to fulfill the ever more demanding role of responsible citizenship."). 
116. See SENATE REPORT 813, supra note 37, at 3 (emphasizing Congress' intent to insure 
full agency disclosure). 
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1988); see also SENATE REPORT 813, supra note 37, at 3 ("It is the 
purpose of the present bill ... to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless 
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language .... "). 
118. The Supreme Court has agreed with this view of§ 552(c). See United States Dept. of 
Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1989) ("Consistent with the Act's goal of broad 
disclosure, these exemptions have been consistently given a narrow compass."); United States 
Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606, 1611 (1988) ("'The mandate of the FOIA calls for 
broad disclosure of Government records,' and for this reason we have consistently stated that 
FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed." (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166 
(1985))); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 
U.S. 352, 361, 366 (1976); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Soucie 
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
119. HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 37, at 5-6, reprinted at 2422-23; GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. 
Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 385 (1980). 
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possible. To narrow the scope ofFOIA's disclosure provisions so as to 
encompass only the watchdog function would severely compromise 
this goal. 120 
2. Case Law Interpreting FOIA 
In addition to FOIA's legislative history, case law developed sub-
sequent to the Act's enactment also supports the idea that FOIA's 
disclosure provisions may have several functions. Most notably, in 
United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 121 the first FOIA 
decision following Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court did not 
consider the nature of the public interest served by disclosure. There, 
the Court required the Department of Justice to release federal district 
court tax opinions and orders to the publisher of a nonprofit tax maga-
zine.122 In reaching this conclusion, the Court first determined that 
the tax opinions were "agency records" within the meaning of section 
552(a)(4)(B) of FOIA. The Court then noted that, because none of 
FOIA's exemptions applied to the tax opinions, the decisions had been 
improperly withheld.123 The Court emphasized that because FOIA's 
exemptions are explicitly exclusive, an agency must disclose any 
records not specifically exempted by the Act. In addition, the Court 
stated that courts are not "in every case to engage in balancing, based 
on public availability and other factors, to determine whether there 
has been a[n] unjustified denial of information. The FOIA invests 
courts neither with the authority nor the tools to make such 
determinations." 124 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun125 argued that the majority holding 
resulted from "an almost gross misuse of the FOIA."126 He noted, 
"What respondent demands, and what the Court permits, adds noth-
ing whatsoever to public knowledge of government operations. That, 
I had thought, and the majority acknowledges, ... was the real pur-
pose of the FOIA and the spirit in which the statute has been inter-
preted thus far." 127 
120. At least one commentator has argued that release of employee names and addresses to 
unions serves FOIA's public interest purpose by assisting unions and the employees that they 
represent in their dealings with federal agencies. See Note, Applying the Freedom of Information 
Act's Privacy Exemption to Requests for Lists of Names and Addresses, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1033, 1048 & n.92 (1990). 
121. 109 S. Ct. at 2841. 
122. 109 S. Ct. at 2844. The Department received the court opinions in the course of its 
litigation of tax cases on behalf of the federal government. 
123. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988) grants United States district courts jurisdiction to order 
the production of "any agency records improperly withheld." 
124. 109 S. Ct. at 2853. 
125. Justice Blackmun cast the single dissenting vote. 
126. 109 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
127. 109 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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In Department of the Treasury, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court in Tax Analysts demanded no showing of any 
public interest at all, observing, "admittedly [the release of the tax de-
cisions] 'add[ed] nothing whatsoever to public knowledge of govern-
ment [executive branch] operations.' " 128 The D.C. Circuit, however, 
did not find its interpretation of FOIA inconsistent with that of the 
Supreme Court in Tax Analysts. According to the court, Tax Analysts 
and Department of the Treasury were distinguishable because "[i]n 
Tax Analysts ... the Court was not considering any FOIA exemption 
at all, but was defining statutory phrases such as 'agency records.' It 
chose to do so in rather neutral terms, independent of FOIA's over-
arching purpose."129 
The D.C. Circuit's reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. If the 
court was contending that it will only consider the public interest in 
disclosure when a FOIA exemption is invoked, then the court's inter-
pretation of FOIA appears somewhat illogical. As Judge Ginsburg 
pointed out, under the D.C. Circuit's analysis, if no privacy exemption 
is at issue, the court will grant any request for information regardless 
of whether any public interest is served. 130 Yet, when even the most 
minimal privacy interest is alleged, the court will prohibit all disclo-
sure - even that which serves an important public interest - unless it 
falls within FOIA's watchdog function. Surely, neither the Supreme 
Court nor Congress could have intended this result. If the court does 
not restrict the public interest that FOIA seeks to further when no 
privacy exemption is present, then the court should not so drastically 
limit the Act's purpose upon the assertion of the most minor privacy 
concern. Rather, when a privacy exemption is asserted, the public in-
terest being served, whatever it may be, should merely be balanced 
against the likely impairment to individual privacy. Under this formu-
lation, while disclosures which serve the watchdog function would be 
given the greatest deference, other public interests would also be taken 
into account. 
The argument that FOIA promotes multiple public interests is par-
ticularly compelling in contextual settings similar to that involved in 
Department of the Treasury, where the union sought disclosure of em-
ployee names and addresses through another disclosure statute, the 
Fed. L-M Statute, and not directly under FOIA. As Part II points 
out, prior to Department of the Treasury, when determining whether a 
government agency must release its employee names and addresses to 
a union under the Fed. L-M Statute, all but one of the circuit courts 
read tQe public interest requirement as being broader than merely as-
128. 884 F.2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting 109 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)). 
129. 884 F.2d at 1452. 
130. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
1002 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:980 
sisting the public in monitoring government activity. Indeed, in De-
partment of Navy v. FLRA, 131 the Third Circuit, which was the only 
circuit court to comment explicitly on the scope of FOIA's disclosure 
provisions, summarily rejected such a narrow reading of FOIA's 
purpose. 
In Department of Navy, the governmental agency advanced the 
very argument later adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Department of the 
Treasury: that collective bargaining did not fall within FOIA's disclo-
sure interest because it did not concern "the operation or conduct of 
government or its agencies."132 The Third Circuit rejected this "crab-
bed" interpretation of the public interest, noting: 
Congress[, in the Fed. L-M Statute,] ... explicitly articulated its view 
that the public interest is served by collective bargaining on behalf of 
government employees. It follows that if disclosure of the requested in-
formation will further collective bargaining, such disclosure would be in 
the public interest ... [this] interest would have to be weighed against 
the relevant privacy interests under the balancing analysis required by 
the Supreme Court for FOIA cases.133 
Although not directly addressing the nature or scope of the public 
interest FOIA seeks to further, other circuit courts implicitly agreed 
with the Third Circuit's analysis. Indeed, until Department of the 
Treasury, no court had followed the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of 
FOIA in American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1923 
v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, where dis-
closure was denied.134 As Part II points out, the Fourth Circuit dis-
tinguished its Local 1923 ruling four years later in FLRA v. 
131. 840 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988). 
132. 840 F.2d at 1136. 
133. 840 F.2d at 1136-37. The court also noted Judge Starr's observation in Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States Department of Justice, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting), revd., 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989), that to consider all releases as "per 
se" in the public interest would "reduce[] the balancing test to a single-factor test." To this, the 
Third Circuit court responded that "[b]ecause we ground our conclusion that disclosure is war-
ranted on Congress' own expression of the public interest in the Fed'l L-M Statute, we need not 
address the concern of the Reporters majority about the absence of congressional standards by 
which to determine the public interest in disclosure." 840 F.2d at 1136-37 n.2. 
134. Recall that in Local 1923 the union sought the employee names and addresses directly 
under FOIA and not by way of the Fed. L-M Statute. The court held that FOIA did not require 
disclosure because collective bargaining did not assist the public in scrutinizing agency action. 
See supra notes 36-42. Even in Local 1923, the court noted that "[the union] may be entitled to 
[employee names and addresses] under some other federal law •.•• We hold only that [FOIA] is 
not a proper vehicle for the disclosure of that information." American Fedn. of Govt. Employ-
ees, Local 1923 v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931, 933 n.3 (4th 
Cir. 1983). Interestingly, when later confronted with an identical request under the Fed. L-M 
Statute, the Fourth Circuit held that FOIA required disclosure. See United States Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the primary difference 
between the later Fourth Circuit opinion and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Department of the 
Treasury lies in the fact that the Fourth Circuit deferred to the FLRA's interpretation of FOIA 
in the collective bargaining context. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The D.C. 
Circuit, however, did not. FLRA v. United States Dept. of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1450-51 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). But see United States Dept. of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.) (The 
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Department of Health and Human Services by emphasizing that in the 
later case the union had sought disclosure under the Fed. L-M Statute. 
When confronted with a similar union request for names and ad-
dresses under the Fed. L-M Statute, the Seventh Circuit went further 
and held that it would require disclosure even in an independent suit 
under FOIA.135 
Thus, although the presence of another disclosure statute makes 
the release of employee names and addresses more compelling, a 
union's request should not be barred even when initiated directly and 
solely under FOIA. As noted above, neither the legislative history of 
the Act nor subsequent cases interpreting it have established the 
watchdog interest as the exclusive disclosure interest promoted by 
FOIA. Indeed, if the legislative intent of FOIA's drafters governed 
and the Act were interpreted to provide for the "fullest possible disclo-
sure," then no agency records would be withheld unless they fell 
within one of FOIA's nine clearly delineated exemptions. Thus, the 
critical inquiry in deciding whether federal agencies must disclose em-
ployee names and addresses to unions should focus on whether the 
requested data are exempted from disclosure by Exemption 6. 
B. Exemption 6 Balancing 
Thus far, this Note has argued that neither FOIA's legislative his-
tory nor case law interpreting the statute supports the notion that the 
watchdog function is the only public interest FOIA seeks to promote. 
Rather, FOIA's disclosure provisions promote other public interests, 
particularly those that are congressionally recognized and statutorily 
protected. Thus, when weighing the public and private concerns 
under Exemption 6, interests other than the watchdog function may 
enter the public interest side of the balance. This section begins by 
exploring the legislative history and case law interpreting Exemption 6 
and concludes by demonstrating that Exemption 6 does not protect 
employee names and addresses from disclosure under FOIA. 
In brief, Exemption 6 bars release of "personnel and medical files 
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy."136 When drafting the ex-
emption, Congress noted: 
The phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" enun-
ciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the pro-
tection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public 
scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to governmental in-
Third Circuit refused to defer to the NLRB's interpretation ofFOIA and yet still held in favor of 
disclosure.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988). 
135. United States Dept. of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
488 U.S. 880 (1988); supra notes 66-68. 
136. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1988). 
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formation. The application of this policy should lend itself particularly 
to those Government agencies where persons are required to submit vast 
amounts of personal data usually for limited purposes. For example, 
health, welfare, and selective service records are highly personal to the 
person involved .... " 137 
Notably, Congress exempted only "clearly unwarranted" invasions 
of personal privacy. Before FOIA's enactment, however, Congress 
was encouraged to revise the language of Exemption 6 in order to 
broaden the scope of its protection.138 The fact that the wording was 
not modified strongly suggests that Congress intended to restrict only 
the release of particularly harmful or embarrassing information. 
A comparison of the wording of Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), 
which the Supreme Court interpreted in Reporters Committee, also 
reveals Congress' intent that Exemption 6 prevent disclosure of only a 
very narrow class of information. Exemption 7(C)'s privacy language 
is broader than that of Exemption 6 in two respects. First, while Ex-
emption 6 demands a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy, Ex-
emption 7(C) only requires that the invasion be "unwarranted." The 
striking of the word "clearly" from Exemption 7(C) resulted from a 
presidential concern that an individual's right to privacy would be in-
adequately protected under the more demanding "clearly unwar-
ranted" standard.139 
Second, Exemption 6 . applies to disclosures that "would consti-
tute" an invasion of privacy. In contrast, Exemption 7(C) encom-
passes only those disclosures that "could reasonably be expected to 
constitute" such an invasion. The legislative history reveals that at the 
time the language "could constitute" was changed to "could reason-
ably be expected to constitute," members of Congress differed over the 
effect of the change. Senator Leahy noted that although the changes 
in 7(C) might create problems with regard to interpretations of Ex-
emption 6, "I am confident that the courts will recognize this change 
as simply codifying their present objective approach to assessing the 
degree of risk, rather than calling for a departure to a less rigorous 
standard."14-0 In contrast, Senator Hatch argued that the amendments 
would "enhance the ability of all Federal Law enforcement agencies to 
withhold additional law enforcement information . . . . There should 
137. SENATE REPORT 813, supra note 37, at 9. 
138. See Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S. 1879 
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 491, 36 (1965) (Edwin Rains, Assistant General Counsel of Treasury 
Department, encouraging deletion of the word "clearly" from the phrase "clearly unwarranted" 
because it would be unduly restrictive); Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on H.R. 5012 
Before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
Government Operations, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 257, 230 (1965) (William Feldesman, NLRB solici-
tor, and Fred B. Smith, Acting General Counsel of Treasury Department doing same). 
139. 120 CoNG. R.Ec. 33,158-59, 34,162-63 (1974) (letter from President Ford). 
140. 132 CONG. R.Ec. Sl6,496 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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be no misunderstanding that ... [the amendments] are intended to 
broaden the reach of [Exemption 7(C)] and to ease considerably a Fed-
eral law enforcement agency's burden in invoking it."141 
Thus, when formulating Exemption 6, Congress intentionally em-
ployed language suggesting that Exemption 6 was to have a very lim-
ited scope. In other words, the exemption covers only a very narrow 
category of extremely private information. Indeed, as noted above, the 
legislative history reveals that Congress was primarily concerned with 
protecting the confidentiality of personal matters contained in files 
kept by agencies like the Veteran's Administration, the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, and the Selective Service.142 Subse-
quent court decisions interpreting Exemption 6 support this assertion. 
For example, in Getman v. NLRB, 143 the D.C. Circuit noted: 
[T]he real thrust of Exemption (6) is to guard against unnecessary disclo-
sure of files of such agencies as the Veterans Administration or the Wel-
fare Department or Selective Service or Bureau of Prisons, which would 
contain "intimate details" of a "highly personal" nature. The giving of 
names and addresses is a very much lower degree of disclosure; in them-
selves a bare name and address give no information about an individual 
which is embarrassing.144 
Nine years later, in Sims v. CIA, 145 the D.C. Circuit reiterated: 
Exemption 6 was intended by Congress to protect individuals from 
public disclosure of "intimate details of their lives, whether the disclo-
sure be of personnel files, medical files, or other similar files." ... [T]he 
disclosures with which the statute is concerned are those involving mat-
ters of an intimate personal nature. Because of its intimate personal na-
ture, information regarding "marital status, legitimacy of children, 
identity of fathers of children, medical condition, welfare payments, al-
coholic consumption, family fights, reputation, and so on" falls within 
the ambit of Exemption 6.146 
Employee names and addresses do not contain such "intimate per-
sonal details." Indeed, the cases in which the Supreme Court held 
that FOIA did not require disclosure, such as the release of case sum-
maries of military cadet honors and ethics hearings147 and the release 
141. 132 CoNG. REc. S16,504 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
142. See, e.g., United States Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 375 (1976). 
143. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
144. 450 F.2d at 675. 
145. 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
146. 642 F.2d at 573-74 (quoting Rural Hous. Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 
F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); see also Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973) 
("[E]xemption [6] applies only to information which relates to a specific person or individual, to 
'intimate details' of a 'highly personal nature' in that individual's employment record or health 
history or the like, and has no relevancy to information that deals with physical things .... "). 
147. See United States Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 
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of FBI rap sheets, 148 involved intimate details whose disclosure could 
have readily led to significant embarrassment or loss of reputation. As 
the Supreme Court noted in United States Department of the Air Force 
v. Rose, 149 "identification of disciplined cadets - a possible conse-
quence of even anonymous disclosure - could expose the formerly 
accused men to lifelong embarrassment, perhaps disgrace, as well as 
practical disabilities, such as loss of employment or friends." 150 A 
similar concern about the release of deeply personal information led 
the Court not to require disclosure in Reporters Committee, where re-
lease of the FBI rap sheets would have disclosed information concern-
ing Charles Medico's history of arrests, charges, convictions, and 
incarcerations.151 
As noted above, employee names and addresses do not involve the 
same or even similar privacy concerns. Release of such information 
should normally produce no undue embarrassment or disgrace. Con-
sequently, given congressional recognition that collective bargaining 
for federal employees is in the public interest, and given the relatively 
minor privacy concerns implicated by the release of employee names 
and addresses, analysis under Exemption 6 demonstrates that the pub-
lic interest in collective bargaining outweighs individual privacy con-
cerns. Therefore, Exemption 6 does not exempt employee names and 
addresses from disclosure under FOIA. 
This result is consistent with the conclusions reached by the circuit 
courts prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Department of the Treas-
ury. As Part II noted, all of these courts recognized that employees 
have some privacy interest in their names and addresses. No court, 
with the exception of the Fourth Circuit in Local 1923, however, be-
lieved that this interest outweighed the public interest in collective 
bargaining. As a result, the courts found that disclosure of employee 
names and addresses did not constitute a "clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy" under Exemption 6. FOIA therefore re-
quired disclosure. Because this result more accurately comports with 
FOIA's legislative history, these decisions are the better rulings. 
CONCLUSION 
In enacting FOIA, Congress sought to establish a general philoso-
phy of full agency disclosure. Thus, when balancing public and pri-
vate interests under FOIA's Exemption 6, the public interest in 
disclosure should not be limited solely to enabling the public to scruti-
nize government activity. Although the watchdog function is un-
148. See United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S. 
Ct. 1468 (1989). 
149. 425 U.S. at 352. 
150. 425 U.S. at 377. 
151. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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doubtedly a major goal of FOIA, the Act serves other public interests 
as well, particularly those interests embodied in disclosure statutes 
such as the Fed. L-M Statute. Indeed, to hold that Exemption 6 bars 
disclosure which is congressionally mandated by another disclosure 
statute would thwart Congress' intent to provide the fullest possible 
disclosure. 
Because Congress has determined that collective bargaining is in 
the public interest, when considering whether employee names and ad-
dresses are to be released to a union, courts should balance this inter-
est against any impairment to individual privacy. Although 
employees may have some minor privacy interest in their names and 
addresses, this information does not contain intimate details the re-
lease of which will lead to significant embarrassment or loss of reputa-
tion. Thus, under an Exemption 6 balance, the privacy concerns of 
individual employees do not outweigh the public interest in collective 
bargaining and disclosure of employee names and addresses does not 
constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Be-
cause FOIA therefore requires disclosure of the names and addresses, 
the Privacy Act does not bar their release. 
- Trina Jones 
